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of the
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Plaintiffs and Appellants,
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CULBERT L. OLSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

* * * * *
CULBERT L. OLSON,
Cross-Complainant and Respondent,
vs.
FRANCES H. BOWEN, Administratrix of
the Estate of J. Parry Bowen, et al.,
Cross-Defendants and Appellants.
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PETITION FOR REHEARING
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

GEORGE B. STANLEY
COLTON & ~OND
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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
FRANCES H. BOWEN, Administratrix of
the Estate of J. Parry Bowen, et. al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
CULBERT L. OLSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

* * * * *

CULBERT L. OLSON,
Cross-Complainant and Respondent,

Case No.

8060

vs.
FRANCES H. BOWEN, Administratrix of
the Estate of J. Parry Bowen, et al.,
Cross-Defendants and Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND

BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Come now the appellants in the above entitled matter,
and respectfully petition this Honorable Court to grant a
rehearing in the above entitled cause.
The specific reasons for requesting a rehearing in this
matter are the following:
1
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I.
The Court errs in failing to hold that appellants were
entitled to a decree quieting their respective titles in view of
the holding in its opinion, that the appellants had adverse
possession for more than seven years, that during said
period two years taxes were not assessed, and that five years
taxes were paid promptly, making a total of seven years, and
that appellants failed to obtain such decree for allowing the
eighth and ninth years' taxes to become delinquent and go
to preliminary tax sale.
II.

The Court errs in holding that the redemption of the
preliminary tax sale for the year 1947, on December 29th,
1949, was not the payment of taxes, under Utah's adverse
possession statute, for the following reasons:

A.
In the seven states listed as holding the "majority rule",
there are seventeen cases cited. Eleven of these seventeen
cases, the states of Arkansas, Illinois, Washington and
South Dakota, are deciding upon limitation statutes which
involve the payment of taxes on "vacant and unoccupied
lands", and no possession is required in such cases. In the
Colorado case, the prior record owner paid one of the seven
years' taxes, breaking the continuity of the adverse possession and the case is not in point. In the two Texas cases,
the ruling is that in adverse possession cases, taxes must
be paid each year before delinquency, and Texas is the only

2
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state holding such a rule. In the two New Mexico cases, it
is held that redemption from a final tax sale comparable
to our May sale, or auditor's sale, is not the payment of
taxes. There are, therefore, only two of seventeen cases
which hold that in adverse possession cases, taxes must be
paid each year before delinquency, which is virtually what
this Supreme Court holds in its opinion.

B.
All states except Texas hold in cases involving adverse
possession and the payment of taxes, that any payment
made to relieve the land from the tax lien prior to the final
sale where title passes (similar to our May sale or auditor's
sale and not our preliminary sale) , is ·a payment of taxes
under the adverse possession statutes.

c.
The taxing statutes of all of the states mentioned in the
opinion of this Supreme Court, except California, have but
one tax sale which is a final sale comparable to our May Sale
or Auditor's Sale, and that except for California, there are
no states which have a tax sale comparable to our Preliminary Sale.
D.
The Utah Supreme Court has held many times that no
title passes at our preliminary sale, that the tax lien is not
extinguished by such sale, and the redemption is made by
paying the taxes to extinguish the tax lien.
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m.
The court erred in holding that the mineral estate was
subject to the general rule it made that redemption was not
the payment of taxes, for the reason that no taxes were
assessed against the mineral estate for the years 1947, 1948
and 1949, and such mineral estate was never sold for taxes.
IV.

The court erred in failing to decide the points raised
in points III, IV and V in the original brief filed by appellants.
SUPPORTING BRIEF
ERROR I.
The headings for the various errors will not be repeated
here. Reference is made to the headings listed in the petition for rehearing proper.
In its opinion in Bowen v. Olson, 268 P.2d 983, at page
984, this Supreme Court says:
"The facts with respect to the payment of taxes
are as follows: No taxes were assessed against
the lands in 1940 or 1941. Each year thereafter
to and including 1946, all taxes were promptly
paid. The taxes for the next two years, 1947-8,
are the ones of critical moment here; they were
not paid and the property was sold for taxes to
Uintah County. On December 30, 1949, after
this suit was commenced, the amount of delinquent taxes, interest, penalties and costs were paid

4
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by "J. Parry Bowen by Morley Dean" and a redemption certificate was issued."
Adding the two years in which no taxes were assessed,
namely 1940 and 1941, to the five years in which taxes
were promptly paid, a total of seven years is obtained. This
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that when no taxes
are assessed, such years may be included within the seven
years required for adverse possession. Seven years adverse
possession and the payment of taxes for seven years are
all that can be required by the decisions in this state.
Appellants in their original brief at page 24 made this
observation:
"The record shows that no taxes were assessed for
the years 1940 and 1941, and that they were
promptly paid by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title for the years 1942, 1943, 1944,
1945 and 1946, or a total of seven years successively."
This Supreme Court, holding with appellants' contention that seven years' taxes were paid, should have granted
a reversal and made an order that the title be quieted in
plaintiffs.
The Utah cases deciding this point are as follows:
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 35
Utah, 528, 101 Pac. 586.
Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler et. al., 45 Utah, 85, 142
Pac. 1119, which states:
5
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To make good title by adverse possession, the defendants were required to pay all taxes lawfully
levied and assessed against the premises so claimed by them. If, however, no taxes were lawfully
assessed or levied against the premises so claimed
and occupied by them, they could acquire title by
adverse possession without payment of taxes. That
seems to be the holding of the California and other
courts under statutes similar to ours." (Quoting
California and Idaho.)
Central Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tarpey, 51 Utah, 107, 168 Pac.
554.
Hanks v. Lee, 57 Utah, 537, 195 Pac. 302.
Other cases from other states are as follows:
United States v. Wooten et. al., 40 F(2d), 882, construing New Mexico tax statutes.
Lara v. Sandell, et. ux., 52 Wash. 58, 100 Pac. 166.
The latest holding in this state is the case of Christensen v. Munster, et. al., 266 P.2d, 756. In that decision this
court said:
"Among other things, our statute, requires payment of all the taxes for 7 consecutive years in
order to acquire title by adverse possession, and
we have said many times that such payment is
necessary before the inchoate interest of an adverse possessor might ripen into a fee."
The 7 consecutive years in the opinion of Utah Copper
Co. v. Chandler et. al., supra, includes years in which no
taxes are assessed.

6
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From the rulings in Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 173,
166 P.2d 239, the period of adversity began on September
30th, 1940.
"Issuance of an auditor's tax deed did not give
the county possession. It was the act of placing
tenants in actual possession which initiated possession by the county. The fact that the auditor's deed
was invalid and the further fact that because of
the invalidity of the May sale a further period
of redemption was vouchsafed to the record owner
does not change the character and nature of the
possession asserted through tenants from being
one under a claim of ownership. At the time
when the county took possession of the property
it did so claiming that it had a valid title, there
having been an attempt to comply with all the
provisions relating to tax sales. The fact that
there were defects in the proceedings did not
change the nature of the county's claim. It was
open, hostile and adverse to the record owner's
right."
As shown by Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, pages 34-36, Burns
Hallett bought the property in question from Uintah County
under an Agreement for Sale of Real Property which recited:
"It is mutually covenanted and agreed between
the parties hereto that the said vendee shall be let
and have immediate possession of~ said premises."
This contract, under the ruling of Bozievich v. Slechta,
supra, was an assertion by the county of its rights under
its Auditor's Tax Deed, and started the statute to running
against Olson.
7
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In the case of Adams v. Lamicq, (Utah), 221 P.2d 1037,

this Supreme Court held:
"No taxes were levied against the eighty acre
tract from 1936 to 1940, but in 1941, 1942, and
1943, the respondents paid taxes on that property
in proportion to their equitable interest in the tract
under their purchase contract."
Under such circumstances, this Supreme Court held
that this was sufficient payment of taxes under the adverse
possession statute. How much more should the payment
of taxes be in the case before the court?
"The County initiated possession in November of
1937 by placing its lessee, Brady, upon the lands.
At the expiration of Brady's term, the respondents
entered upon the lands under a one year lease with
the County, and after obtaining a contract to
purchase and later a quitclaim deed, they remained
there until the commencement of this action. In
Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239,
this court held that the act of a county in placing
tenants upon property to which the county claimed
title thereto under a Auditor's Tax Deed constituted a possession adverse to the record title owner
even though it was later revealed that the auditor's
tax deed was void because of defects in the tax
sale procedure."
Appellants most strongly urge that the rulings of this
court that the plaintiffs had seven years adverse possession
commencing September 30th, 1940, that no taxes were
assessed for 1940 and 1941, and that plaintiffs paid the taxes
for the years 1942 to1946 inclusive before they became
8
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due, already hold that plaintiffs have complied with the
adverse possession statutes and are now vested in fee simple
with the title.
ERROR II.
SUBDIVISION A.
The case of Bowen vs. Olson, (Utah) 268 Pac. 2d, 983,
·in foot note 1 at the bottom of page 984, makes this statement:
"The cases cited by the plaintiffs in support of
their contention do not involve any question of
adverse possession.''
An examination of the cases cited in footnotes from 2

to 9 inclusive, and 12, disclose that the cases revolved upon
the following statutes of limitation:
ARKANSAS:

-

(1) Wyse v. Johnson, 83 Ark. 520, 104 S.W. 204.
The case turns on the limitation statute in the Digest of
the Statutes of Arkansas, Kirby & Castle, 1916, page 1428,
as follows:
"SECTION 5985. Unimproved and uninclosed
land shall be deemed and held to be in possession
of the person who pays the taxes thereon if he have
color of title thereto, but no person shall be entitled to invoke the benefit of this act unless he and
those under whom he claims shall have paid such
taxes for at least seven years in succession, and
not less than three of such payments must be
made subsequent to the passage of this act (5).
Act March 18, 1899."
9
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(2) Walsh v. Certain Lands, 209 Ark. 320, 190 S.W. 2d,
447.
The case turns on the limitation statute in Pope's Digest, 1937, in Section No. 13856, as follows:
"SECTION 13856. Unimproved and uninclosed
land shall be deemed and held to be in possession
of the person who pays the taxes thereon if he
have color of title thereto, but no person shall be
entitled to invoke the benefit of this act unless he
and those under whom he claims shall have paid
such taxes for at least seven years in succession,
and not less than three of such payments must be
made subsequent to the passage of this act. Act
March 18, 1899."
ILLINOIS:
(1) Holbrook v. Dickinson, 56 Ill. 497:
ejectment.

Action in

The case turns on the act of March 2, 1839, which is
still in effect today. It reads as follows as quoted from
Cahill Illinois Revised Statues, 1927, pages 2110, et. seq,
and the limitation is known as Section 7:
"Whenever a person having color of title, made in
good faith, to vacant and unoccupied land, shall
pay all taxes legally assessed thereon for seven
successive years, he or she shall be deemed and
adjudged to be the legal owner of said vacant and
unoccupied land, to the extent and according to the
purport of his or her paper title. All persons holding under such tax-payer, by purchase, devise or
descent, before said seven years shall have expired,
and who shall continue to pay the taxes, as afore10
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said, so as to complete the payment of taxes for
the term aforesaid, shall be entitled to the benefit
of this section: Provided, however, if any person,
having a better paper title to said vacant and unoccupied land, shall, during the said term of seven
years, pay the taxes assessed on said land for any
one or more years of the said term of seven years,
then and in that case such tax-payer, his heirs and
assigns, shall not be entitled to the benefit of this
section."
(2) Hart v. Randolph, 142 Ill. 521, 32 N.E. 517: Action for setting forth dower.
Quotes from Irving v. Brownell, 11 Ill. 402, Woodruff
v. McHarry, 56 Ill. 218, and Holbrook v. Dickenson, 56 Ill.
497. It recites:
"A purchase of land at the tax sale is not a payment of the tax within the meaning of the statute,
(Irving v. Brownell, 11 Ill. 402, Woodruff v. MeHarry, 56 Ill. 218), nor is redemption from the
tax sale such a payment. (Holbrook v. Dickenson,
56 Ill. 497.) "
The statute referred to is Section 7 above quoted.
(3) Robertson v. Bachman, 352 Ill. 291, 185 N.E. 618:
Recites as follows:
"That redemption from a forfeiture is not a payment of taxes within the meaning of section 7 of
the Limitations act is in accord with the construction placed upon an identical section of the laws
of Washington by the Supreme Court of that State.
Seymour v. Dufur, 53 Wash. 756, 102, Pac. 756;
Kennedy v. Anderson, 88 Wash. 457, 153 Pac. 319."
11
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This construes the case as one revolving on the above
quoted Section 7 which does not involve adverse possession.
(4)
ment.

Irving vs. Brownell, 11 Ill. 403: Action in eject-

This case actually involved adverse possession and the
payment of taxes. However it is shown that the defendant
(the adverse possessor) took possession in 1841.
"The purchase by defendant of land for taxes of
1844, was no payment by him, but a purchase.
The taxes were paid by plaintiff when he redeemed
from that sale." (Emphasis ours.)
The same ruling was handed down in this case as was
handed down by this Supreme Court in Aggelos v. Zelia Min.
Co., 99 Utah 417, 107 P.2d 170, 132 A.L.R. 213. There is
no question about redemption being the payment of taxes
allowed by the adverser to go delinquent.
(5) Woodruff v. McHarry, 56 Ill. 218; Action in ejectment.
Turns on the Limitation Statute, Section 7, as above
quoted, and makes the following remarks:
"The defendant also sets up color of title and payment of taxes for seven years. But the land was
sold one year during the seven, and although bid
in for the benefit of the defendant, the bid being
paid with his money, yet this was not a payment
of taxes, within the statute, as has been repeatedly
decided by this court."
No adverse possession was involved in this action. The

12
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distinction between this class of cases in Illinois, and those
involving adverse possession and the payment of taxes are
set forth under another heading, and the attention of the
court is urgently invited to the perusal of the cases involving adverse possession.
WASHINGTON:
(1) Tremmel et al. v. Mess et al., 46 Wash. 137, 89 P.
487: Action to quiet title.
Statute construed:
Codes & St., as follows:

Section 5504, 2 Ballinger's Ann.

"Every person having color of title made in good
faith to vacant and unoccupied lands, who shall pay
all taxes legally assessed thereon for seven successive years, he or she shall be deemed and adjudged the legal owner of said vacant and unoccupied land to the extent and according to the purport
of his or her paper title. All persons holding under
such taxpayer, by purchase, devise, or descent, before said seven years shall have expired, and who
shall continue to pay the taxes as aforesaid, so as
to complete the payment of taxes for the term
aforesaid, shall be entitled to the benefit of this
section: Provided, however, if any person have a
better paper title to said vacant and unoccupied
land shall, during the said term of seven years,
pay the taxes as assessed on said land for any one
or more years of said term of seven years, then
and in that case such taxpayer, his heirs or assigns,
shall not be entitled to the benefit of this section."
In this case, the tax deed was void for irregularity, as

has been held in the case before the court. The court says:

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"It will be seen that the appellants and their predecessor, Mr. Lambert, have paid seven years'
taxes; but the first payment of taxes, if a redemption of a tax certificate may be said to be a payment of taxes within the statute above quoted, was
made in 1902. This action was brought in 1906,
so that only four years elapsed after the first payment of the taxes. The Supreme Court of Illinois
has construed a statute identical with ours to mean
that, in order to constitute a bar, seven years must
elapse between the date of the first payment and
the commencement of the suit. Burton v. Perry,
146 Ill. 71, 126, 34 N. E. 60, and cases there cited.
We think that construction is undoubtedly correct."
It is to be noted here, that the decision is the same as
the case of Aggelos v. Zelia Min. Co., supra, which holds

that payment of taxes already delinquent at the time of the
tax title purchase, cannot be considered the payment of
taxes under our adverse possession statute.
(2) Seymour v. Dufur, 53, Wash. 646, 102 P. 756: Action in Ejectment.
This case turns on Section 5504, Ballinger's Ann. Codes
& St. (Pierce's Code, No. 1161), as hereinabove quoted. The
court says:
"It is conceded in this case that these taxes were
not paid by the respondent every successive year
during the seven years. But it was shown that
they had been paid before the commencement of
the action by the introduction of 10 different delinquent tax certificates; all the receipts showing
that these certificates of delinquency had been

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

taken out by different parties other than the respondent. The respondent contends that it is sufficient if the taxes for seven successive years have
been paid, while it is the contention of the appellants that these taxes must be paid each successive
year. This is the construction which was placed upon this statute by this court in Tremmel v. Mess, 46
Wash. 137, 89 Pac. 487, and we think that this is
the reasonable construction. The construction of
section 5503 of Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St.
(Pierce's Code, No. 1160) would be different from
that of section 5504, because in the former section
the person paying the taxes must be in open and
notorious possession of the lands or tenements under claim and color of title, while section 5504 provides for a case where there is no possession, and
the payment of taxes annually would be to a certain extent notice to the owner of a claim against
the land." (Emphasis ours.)
Here, a distinction is made between cases involving the
payment of taxes as the only requirement, and the cases
involving adverse possession and the payment of taxes.
This will be discussed later.
(3) Kennedy v. Anderson, 88 Wash. 457, 153 P. 319:
Action to reform a deed and to quiet title.
The decision is based upon Section 5504, Ballinger's
Ann. Codes & St. (Pierce's Code, No. 1161), and follows the
case of Tremmel v. Mess, supra. The court says:
"The appellants also claim title to the land in question by reason of having paid taxes for seven years.
But is appears plainly from the record that the land
was not in the active possession of any one, but
15
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was entirely wild and unimproved; that in May,
1912, when taxes were delinquent against this tract
of land, the appellant redeemed some tax certificates and paid the taxes for the year 1912, making
six years' taxes in all. We have held that, in order
to acquire title by the payment of taxes upon vacant and unoccupied lots, as these lots were, the
payment cannot be made in one sum, but must
be made in successive years. Tremmel v. Mess, 46
Wash. 137. 89 Pac. 487." (Emphasis ours.)
SOUTH DAKOTA:
(1) Cain v. Ehrler, 33 S. D. 536, 146 N. W. 694:
South Dakota limitation statutes are taken from Illinois and are practically identical to the Illinois statute. The
case turns on what is Section 7 of the Illinois statute heretofore quoted. Only the payment of taxes is involved and
no possession. 10 years' payment of taxes are required.
The court states:
"The taxes for the years 1895, 1896, and 1897 were
were allowed to become delinquent, and the property went to sale in payment thereof; but the respondent redeemed from these sales by paying
these taxes in full prior to the commencement of
the action; and this, he contends, complied with
the statute relative to the payment of taxes. In
this contention appellant is wrong. A redemption
from a delinquent tax sale is not a payment of the
tax for which the sale was made, within the provisions of this statute. Sections 54 and 55, Code
Civ. Proc., are adopted from the statutes of the
state of Illinois (Rev. St. Ill. 1899 No. 6, 7, C. 83),
where the statute has been in force practically as
it is now since 1839."
16
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This state, then, follows the Illinois rules quoted.
(2) Bertrand v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co.,
33 S. D. 593, 146 N. W. 1914: This case follows Illinois
under Section 7 above. No adverse possession is involved.
COLORADO:
(1) Webber v. Wannemaker, 39 Colo. 425, 89 Pac. 780.
Construes Section 2923, 2 Mills' Ann. St., and 2923e, 3
Mills' Ann. St. Rev. Supp.
The opinion of the court states:
"If the defendant paid the taxes for one of these
years and the plaintiff did not, she cannot then
invoke the statute. By such finding the court in
effect holds that the plaintiff did not comply with
the statute. The fact that the defendant paid
them voluntarily would simply operate to prevent
recovery from the plaintiff, but cannot assist the
plaintiff to meet the plain requirements of the statute."

Froni this quotation, it can be seen that the case turns
on the fact that the defendant paid one year's taxes out
of the seven. In the case now before this Supreme Court,
Olson did not pay any taxes from 1933 to 1949 inclusive, but
the plaintiffs and their predecessors paid all taxes assessed
according to law from 1940 to 1949 inclusive, a period of ten
years. This case is the same as Christensen v. Munster,
(Utah), 266 P.2d 756, and is not a parallel case. The statement that "Redemption from sale does not constitute payment of taxes," is merely dicta.

17
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There is a dearth of Colorado cases in which possession
is involved. There are many which involve the statute
similar to No. 7 of the Limitation laws of Illinois heretofore
quoted, and from which the Colorado statute is taken. No.
143, 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, Vol. 2, Page 580
is the same as No. 6 of the Illinois statutes. No. 144 of
the same Colorado Statutes, is the same as No. 7 of the
Illinois Statutes and does not require any possession.
TEXAS:
(2) Churchman v. Rumsey, et. al., (Texas) 166 S.W.
2d 960. Action of Trespass to Try Title.
Statutes construed: Article 5509, R. C. S. 1925, and
Article 5510, R. C. S., 1925.
Art. 5509, 5674, 3342, 3193 FIVE YEARS' POSSESSION, recites:
"Every suit to recover real estate as against a person having peaceable and adverse possession thereof, cultivating, using or enjoying the same, and paying taxes thereon, if any, and claiming under a deed
or deeds duly registered, shall be instituted within
five years next after cause of action shall have
accrued, and not afterward."
Decision of the Court:
"The law is well settled in this State that where
title to land is claimed under the five-year statute
of limitation, Article 5509, R. C. S. 1925 it must
be shown that the taxes were paid before they became delinquent and the party claiming such title
must have had peaceable and adverse possession
18
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thereof for the statutory period, cultivating, using
and enjoying the same, concurrently with the payment of taxes before they became delinquent."
(Cases cited.)
(2)

Hufstedler v. Barnett, (Texas) 182 S. W. 2d 504.

This case is not in point for the reason that the taxes
were paid by the adverser and he obtained his decree quieting title. Statements were quoted from Churchman v. Rumsey, supra.
Texas is the only state in the union which holds payment of taxes before delinquency necessary in order to
acquire title while in adverse possession, C. J. S. Adverse
Possession, No. 176. The other states hold such to be the
case where only the payment of taxes is involved in the
statute and no possession is necessary.
NEW MEXICO:
As a preliminary statement to the New Mexico cases,

attention is invited to the fact that Utah has a preliminary
sale and an auditor's sale which are held over four years
apart. New Mexico has only one sale and that is comparable to our auditor's sale or May sale.
Under the New Mexico statutes, title passes to the purchaser at the tax sale, and the tax lien is extinguished which
is not the case in the preliminary sale in Utah. A discussion of statutes will be made in a subsequent division of this
brief.
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(1) McGrail v. Fields, 53 N. M. 158, 203 P. 2d 1000.
The comment is made that in this case the New Mexico
court commits the same error as this Supreme Court has
committed in the instant case. Cases which do not involve
possession are confused with cases involving adverse possession.
The case under consideration involved adverse possession.
The facts set forth in McGrail v. Fields, supra, could
not possibly make it a parallel case to the one at bar. The
facts stated are these:
"'W. F. Roark went into possession of the premises
at the time of the attempted conveyance thereof
to him by G. J. Moore on May 29, 1929; and the
court found that W. F. Roark and his successors
continued such possession for a period of ten years
after May 29, 1929. On March 30, 1935, W. F.
Roark and wife conveyed the premises to P. L.
Hubby, the deed being filed for record on May 11,
1937. The property was conveyed by P. L. Hubby
and wife to Helen Fields, appellee, on October 3,
1945.
" 'The property was sold for taxes for the year
1936, and Tax Sale Certificate No. 2697 was issued
to C. M. Allred. Redemption was made therefrom
by W. F. Roark by Redemption Certificate No.
1552. It was again sold for taxes for the year
1942, to the State of New Mexico, and Tax Sale
Certificate No. 6609 was issued and assigned to
B. L. Huchton. Redemption was made by M. B.
Johnson by Redemption Certificate No. 3419.'
20
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"'It is apparent from the record that Johnson was
acting as agent for Hubby in redeeming this property from tax sale.'"
As shown in the next subdivision of this brief, title
passes in New Mexico when the Certificate of Sale is issued.
The property involved was sold to C. M. Allred, a stranger
to the title, in 1936. In 1942 the property was sold to New
Mexico, and the tax sale certificate assigned to another
stranger to the title, B. L. Huchton. In both cases, redemption was made from this sale by the adversers, but the redemption was made to redeem their title which had passed
to the purchasers.
In Utah, no title passes and the tax lien is not extinguished when the preliminary tax sale is made and no assignment of any tax sale can be made to anyone but an
iiicumbrancer, as hereinafter shown. No stranger to the
title is involved in the case at bar. Morley Dean had a right
to redeem from the sale to relieve his property from the tax
lien and his title remaining in him, the redemption was a
payment of taxes and not a redemption of his title.
(2)

Pueblo De Taos v. Gusdorf, 50 F. 2d 721, (New

Mexico).
The statutes of New Mexico involved in this case will
be discussed in the next succeeding sub-heading of this brief.
The case hinges on the following:
'' 'The sale of land to the county discharged the
claim for taxes. In lieu of such claim, the county
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took the legal title to claim No. 8 subject to the
former owner's right of redemption. It had the
right to sell such title evidenced by the certificate
of sale at either a private sale for its face value,
or at public sale to the highest bidder. The payment in question was made not to discharge a
claim for taxes but to redeem claim No. 8 from
the sale and to reinvest in the former owner the
legal title thereto. It was not a payment of
taxes.'"
The preliminary sale in Utah does not convey the title
to the county as shall be discussed later. The county has
no right to sell, under Utah statutes, a preliminary tax sale
certificate either at public or private sale.
The two New Mexico cases are not parallel to our preliminary sale and are not in point in the present discussion.
In summary, it may be said that of the seventeen cases
used by this Supreme Court in establishing its "majority
rule", only two, the Texas cases, can in any way be held to
be parallel to the case at bar. It is the only state which
holds, that in cases involving adverse possession and the
payment of taxes, the taxes must be paid before delinquency.
In the instant case, the same ruling is made, inasmuch as
our preliminary sale is held immediately after the delinquency date, and no title passes by such preliminary sale.
In the instant case, at page 985 of the Pacific reporter,
this court states:
"Another and perhaps the most important consideration is that one of the purposes of the statute
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requiring payment of taxes in order to establish
adverse possession is that by paying taxes on the
land a public record is made which gives notice to
the owner that his land is being claimed adversely.
This purpose cannot be fulfilled if the possessor
can wait any number of years, even up to the
necessary seven, and then pay the taxes in one
lump sum by redeeming. Under such circumstances the owner would get no current notice of adverse claims against his property, and may not
until it is too late to do anything about it." (Emphasis ours.)
To support this contention, the case of McDonald v.
McCoy, 121 Cal. 55, 53 P. 424, is cited. This case does not
uphold the above contention but rests on the following:
"In 1899 the administrator of the estate of Henry
S. Burton, deceased, by virtue of the decree in the
case of McDonald against Burton, above mentioned,
was put into possession of Rancho Jamul. He continued in possession as such administrator until
after the administrator's deed to plaintiff, February 18, 1895. * * * * While the administrator
was in possession, no taxes were paid. The rancho
was assessed for taxes each year, and the taxes
were regularly allowed to become delinquent, and
under the statute the land was sold to the state.
After the probate sale in 1895, the administrator
redeemed the property from these sales, by paying
to the state the required amounts, and received
certificates showing that a redemption had been
affected. * * * * * No taxes were paid, even if
such redemption could be called a payment of taxes,
until he ceased to have or to claim any right to
possession. But, though the redemption had been
effected while he was still in possession claiming
23
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title, it would not have been a compliance with
the law. If there is anything of benefit to the
state contemplated by this anomalous law, it is
that it will have a tendency to induce people to
pay their taxes, and not compel the state to take
title subject to redemption." (Emphasis ours.)
We have the same situation as in numerous other cases
involved herein. In the above case the state took title which
is not so in the instant case. It is to be noted in the abovequoted case, that seven years' taxes were delinquent when
redeemed, so that the situation is the same as it would be
in this state after Auditor's Tax Deed has issued to the county.
Issue is taken with the court's ruling that in adverse
possession cases, payment of the tax alone gives notice to
the owner that his land is being claimed adversely. In
adverse possession cases, it is the open, hostile, notorious
and adverse possession which "waves the flag" and gives
notice to the former owner. In cases which do not involve adverse possession, but allow an adverser to obtain
title by paying of taxes only, the consecutive paying of taxes
each year is necessary to give notice that the land is being
held adversely, Seymour v. Dufur, supra, Kennedy v. Anderson, supra, Tremmel et al. v. Mess et al., supra, Robertson v. Bachman, supra, and many other like cases. In its
opinion, this Supreme Court in the instant case has followed
the rule laid down in cases which do not require adverse
possession and the payment of taxes conjointly, but require
merely the payment of taxes without possession.
24
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SUBDzyiSION B.
We have seen from the cases heretofore quoted which
involve statutes requiring payment of taxes only as the requisite for establishing title, that a rather stringent rule
was adopted under such statutes to the effect that the only
noice given to the better paper title holder that his land
was claimed adversely, was by the continuous payment of
taxes before they went to tax sale. We will now discuss
those cases in the states holding to the "majority rule" mentioned in this court's opinion which require adverse possession as well as the payment of taxes. These are as follows:
ILLINOIS:
(1) Lewis v. Ward, 99 Ill., 525.

Construing Section

6 of the Limitations Act, Chapter 83, Limitations, Cahill
Illinois Revised Statues, 1927, in effect since March 2nd,
1839, which reads:
"No. 6. Every person in the actual possession of
lands or tenements, under claim and color of title,
made in good faith, and who shall, for seven successive years, continue in such possession, and shall
also, during said time, pay all taxes legally assessed
on such lands or tenements, shall be held and adjudged to be the legal owner of said lands or tenements, to the extent and according to the purport
of his or her paper title. All persons holding under
such possession, by purchase, devise or descent, before said seven years shall have expired, and who
shall continue such possession, and continue to pay
the taxes as aforesaid, so as to complete the possession and payment of taxes for the term afore25
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said, shall be entitled to the benefit of this section."
In its opinion the court said:

"It was also urged that the taxes which were legally assessed on this land, were not paid seven successive years, by appellee, while he was in possession. This act of limitation was adopted by the
legislature, and took effect on the second day of
March, 1839, and as the appellee was then in possession, it began to run from that date, and the full
period of the time limited expired at the end of
seven years from that time. And we have seen
that all the taxes on the land, except the city tax
for the year 1846, were paid from 1839 to those
assessed for the year 1846, without interruption,
which embraced a period of seven full consecutive
years. And it can make no difference whether
the taxes for the year 1845 were paid within that,
or the succeeding year, as he was still in the occupancy, and made the payment under his claim and
color of title. In either event it completed the
payment of taxes for the period of limitation, and
answers fully the requirements of this section of
the statute. There was, then, actual possession,
under claim and color of title, made in good faith,
connected with payment of all taxes, legally assessed upon the land, for the full period of limitation,
and the bar to a recovery, by the former owner,
was then complete and availing, and the appellee,
as such occupant, became entitled to, and possessed
of, all the rights which the statute can confer."
(2)

Hinchman v. Whetstone, 23 III. 108. Construing

said Section 6 of the Illinois limitation statutes:
"Although the taxes upon land may not have been
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paid within each year for seven successive years,
yet, if they were paid in one year for another of
the seven, the party still being in possession under
claim and color of title, the requirements of the
statute of limitations, which took effect in 1839,
will have been complied with." (Emphasis ours.)
We wish to note here, that in lllinois and the states following that state as hereinafter set out, in cases where adverse possession and occupancy are involved, the so-called
"majority rule" set out by this Supreme Court in Bowen
vs. Olson, supra, does not apply.
SOUTH DAKOTA:
(1) Murphy v. Redeker, 94 NW 697; 16 S. Dak. 615;
102 Am. St. Rep. 722.
Construes Section 1, Chapter 24, page 78, Laws of 1891.
This statute is the same as No. 6 of the limitation statutes
of Illinois.
In its opinion the court said:
"The application and legal effect of the foregoing
statute are not controverted, but counsel for appellent maintain that each payment must be made
within the year for which the tax was levied and
that a delay on the part of one of the earlier claimants in paying the taxes of 1891 until July 9, 1892,
is fatal to respondents' claim of ownership. Without placing upon the plain terms in which the Legislature has spoken a construction different from
the ordinary meaning of the words employed, and
by which the real puurpose of the enactment would
be often defeated, the contention of counsel is not
sustainable. Beyond question, this payment of all
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legal taxes during 10 successive years, by persons
clearly within the statute in. every other respect,
is a substantial compliance therewith, although
the annual assessment becomes delinquent, and is
not paid until the following year. Numerous states
have provided for the acquisition of land by occupants paying taxes in good faith under color of
title for a specified number of years, and the Statute of Illinois is practically the same as our provision. above quoted. For many years the courts of
that state, under a seven-year limitation, have held
unswervingly upon the propostion as follows:
"Although the taxes upon land may not have been
paid within each year for seven successive years,
yet, if they were paid in one year or another of the
seven, the party still being in possession under
claim and color of title, the requirements of the
statute of limitations, which took effect in 1839,
will have been complied with." Hinchman v. Whetstone, 23 Ill. 185." (Emphasis ours.)
NORTH DAKOTA:
(1) Stiles v. Granger, 17 N.D. 502, 117 N. W. 777.
Construes Section 4928, Rev. Codes 1905, and reads:
"The first question for determination is whether
the purchase at tax sale December 6, 1898, for the
taxes for the year 1897, by the appellant, constitutes a payment within the meaning of the statute
above quoted. Respondent urges that it is not a
payment, and that the deed from Bowdle to appellant within the terms of the statute referred to.
The appellant contends that it does constitute payment, and that the deed held by him is adequate
title to sustain his defense. When the oversight
occurred, and the land was accidently sold to the
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appellant, he was in possession, claimmg ownership,
under his deed from Bowdle. It was his duty to
pay the taxes. He bad for many years recognized
this duty, and had paid them each year, and continued to pay them subsequent to the sale. No
question of good faith is involved. He held his
certificate nine years after the sale without making application for a deed. The sa!e of land to the
person claiming ownership and in possession, whose
duty it is to pay the taxes, is void, and operates as
a payment. The purchaser under such circumstances acquires no title by his purchase, and it is
deemed to be only one method paying the taxes.
Good faith is presumed, in the absence of evidence
showing the contrary. Christy v. Fisher, 58 Cal.
256, and cases cited; Smith v. Lewis et. al., 20 Wis.
369; Bassett v. Welch, 22 Wis., 175; Whitney v.
Gunderson, 31 Wis. 359 and 379; Murphy v. Redeker et. al., 16 S. D. 615, 94 N. W. 697, 102 Am.
St. Rep. 722; Swan et. al. v. Rainey, 59 Ark. 364,
27 S. W. 240; Douglas v. Dangerfield, 10 Ohio,
1952; Morrison v. Norman, 47 Ill. 477; Davis v.
Hall, 92 Ill. 85. Respondent cites some early Illinois cases to the effect that a purchase at tax sale
may not be a payment of the taxes, when made by
the party in possession; but the court of that state
fails to discuss the question, or the facts show that
the good faith of the payment was involved, and
that the purchase was made with the intention of
acquiring a deed thereunder and with a hostile purpose. In Lewis v. Ward, 99 Ill. 525, the Supreme
Court of that state says: 'The law is well settled
that certain persons, on account of their relations
to the property or their obligations to pay the taxes thereon, are forbidden by the policy of the law
to become purchasers of the lands at a tax sale.
The rule admits of no exception that a purchase
by one whose duty it is to pay the tax operates
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as a payment and nothing more.' Had appellant
intentionally omitted the payment of the 1897 tax,
and purchased at the tax sale with the purpose of
acquiring title under his purchase, a different case
would be presented, and his good faith might well
be questioned. Under the facts and circumstances
of this case, we conclude that the purchase by
the appellant was a payment of the taxes for the
year 1897, within the requirement of section 4928,
supra."
In construing this case, this Supreme Court in Bowen
v. Olson, supra, on page 984 of the Pacific Reporter states:
"The North Dakota case of Stiles v. Granger is
distinguishable, the court having rested its decision on the special fact of mistake or inadvertence
because an agent failed to pay the taxes as instructed, and the court said that a different result might
be reached if the failure to pay had been intentional."
The quotation made herein from the above case of Stiles
v. Granger goes further than intimated by this Supreme
Court. It holds that in cases where "POSSESSION" is involved, that a purchase at the final tax sale by the tax title
purchaser who has been in possession for a number of years,
and whose duty it is to pay the taxes, amounts to a PAYMENT OF TAXES. North Dakota has only one tax sale.
Utah has two, the preliminary sale and the auditor's sale
as hereinafter fully discussed. The property is not offered
for sale to the public until the auditor's sale in May, four
years after the preliminary tax sale. It is this final auditor's
sale that the North Dakota case is talking about, and if
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Morley Dean had let his taxes go the four years, and bid in
the property at the May Sale of 1952, it would have been the
payment of taxes under the ruling laid down by the North
Dakota court and the states it quotes.
WASHINGTON:
(1) Lara v. Sandell, et. ux., 52 Wash. 58, 100 Pac. 166:
Construes Section 5503, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St.
(Pierce's Code, No. 1160), which reads as follows:
"Every person in actual, open and notorious possession of lands or tenements under claim and color
of title, made in good faith, and who shall for seven
successive years continue in possession and shall
also during said time pay all taxes legally assessed
on such lands or tenements, shall be held and adjudged to be the legal owner of said lands or tenements, to the extent and according to the purport
of his or her paper title."
The opinion reads:
''The necessary prerequisites under this section are:
(1) Claim and color of title made in good faith;
(2) actual, open, and notorious possession continued for seven successive years; and (3) payment
of all taxes legally assessed during that time. Whatever the rule may be in other jurisdictions, it is
firmly established in this state that a void tax
deed may constitute a sufficient basis for the running of the statute of limitations. Hamilton v.
Witner, 97 Pac. 1084, and cases cited. And we
think it clearly appears from the record before
us that the respondents were in actual, open, and
notorious possession of the lands in controversy
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under claim and color of title made in good faith,
and that such possession continued for upwards of
seven successive years prior to the commencement
of the present action. The appellant contends,
however, that the three prerequisites we have mentioned must exist concurrently without interruption, and must continue throughout the entire seven-year period, and that it does not appear that
seven years elapsed between the date of the first
payment of taxes under claim and color of title
made in good faith and the commencement of this
action. This contention is based largely on decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and it must
be conceded that under the decisions of that court
the period of adverse possession does not commence to run until a tax payment has been made.
Glos v. Wheeler, 229 Ill. 272, 82 N. E. 235. This
court followed the Illinois cases in Tremmel v.
Mess, 46 Wash. 137, 89 Pac. 487. in construing
section 5504, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. (Pierce's
Code, No. 1161), which relates to vacant and unoccupied lands, but under that section it is quite
manifest that the statute of limitations or adverse
possession cannot commence to run until there has
been a payment of taxes, for there is nothing else
to mark the commencement of the statutory period. It seems to us that this rule should not apply
in construing section 5503. The only requirement
of the latter section is that the adverse possession
shall be continued for seven years, and that the
occupant shall pay all taxes legally assessed during
that time. To hold that seven years of adverse
possession is not complete until seven years have
elapsed after the first payment of taxes under claim
and color of title made in good faith is to add materially to the language of the statute." (Emphasis ours.)
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(2) Seymour v. Dufur, 53 Wash. 646, 112 P. 756 heretofore quoted says:
''The construction of section 5503 of ·Ballinger's
Ann. Codes & St. (Pierce's Code, No. 1160) would
be different from that of section 5504, because in
the former section the person paying the taxes
must be in open and notorious possession of the
lands or tenements under claim and color of title,
while section 5504 provides for a case where there
is no possession, and the payment of taxes annually
would be to a certain extent notice to the owner
of a claim against the land."
NEW MEXICO:
United States v. Wooten et. al. 40 F. (2d), 882.
"The United States, as guardian of the Indians of
the Pueblo of Taos, sued to quiet title to 78 tracts
of land; the decision of the trial court was adverse
to the government as to part of the tracts; and
this appeal challenges the correctness of the decree
as to twelve of them. While the facts differ somewhat in the twelve cases, one fact is common to
all of the cases, and that is that taxes levied by
the state upon the lands prior to June 7, 1924
(the date of the Pueblo Lands Act (25 USCA No.
331 note) ) , were not paid by the defendants prior
to delinquency. When claimants must pay taxes
in order to avail themselves of the rights given
adverse possessors by the Pueblo Lands Act is the
principal question in the case."

"We conclude that a claimant of Pueblo lands must
(a) prove the adverse possession described by the
act from the respective dates to June 7, 1924; (b)
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that he must have paid all taxes on the lands
claimed which were assessed and levled in conformity with the New Mexico laws from the respective dates to June 7, 1924, unless exempt
therefrom; (c) that the extent of the payment required is measured by section 3365, Code of 1915.
"IV. Section 3365 requires that the claimant shall
have 'for the period mentioned in this section continuously paid all the taxes' levied by state or municipal authorities. Save in one or two instances
separately noticed, it is conceded that prior to the
filing of this suit, in 1927, the claimants, or their
predecessors in interest, had paid all such taxes
which were assessed from 1899, or 1902, down to
and including 1924; by 1927, they had paid up
all the taxes, interest, and penalties, levied during
the period involved, and were square with the
state. The payments had not been interrupted by
others paying or by failure to pay for certain years,
or by tax deeds. However, in none of the cases
had the taxes for all of the years been paid before
delinquency. The government contends that the
taxes must not only all be paid, but each year's
taxes must be paid before delinquency; that a settler loses his rights if the 1906 tax, for example, was
not paid until July of 1907.
"This argument is grounded upon the word 'continuously,' which we had supposed meant without
break or interruption. Counsel for the government, in his brief, defines it otherwise variously
as 'regularly,' 'promptly and completely,' 'promptly and regularly,' with 'punctuality,' 'when due,'
etc. Suffice it is to say, that, unless there is controlling authority, or commending reason from the
context, this court cannot construe 'continuously'
into 'promptly.' If Congress had intended that
the claim of these settlers should be defeated if,
at any time in the 22-year stretch, the settler had
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not paid his taxes until they became delinquent,
it could easily have said so by inserting the words
'promptly' or 'before delinquency.' Or, if the New
Mexico Legislature had intended the same thing,
it could have accomplished the result sought, by
similar wording in section 3365. When two legislative bodies have overlooked the opportunity to
aptly word their statutes to express a requirement
of punctuality, we are not justified in supplying
the omission.
"Counsel contends that the act requires that claimants 'must have paid all taxes continuously from
1899, or 1902, to 1924.' The act is otherwise; it
requires payment of taxes 'levied thereon * * * *
from the 16th day of March, 1899, to the date of
the passage of this Act.' Section 4 (b) . That
is, the time limits apply to levy and not to payment. Counsel further contends that the word
'all' in the New Mexico statute required that the
taxes must be completely paid; that, therefore,
continuously must be construed as 'before delinquency' or be given no meaning. As we read this
statute, one claiming under it must show that he
has paid 'all' (not a part of those levied) 'continuously' (for each of the years of the period). But
even if it be tautology, that common fault of legislative draftsmen does not, in our opinion, justify
impressing upon a word a meaning it does not have.
"The New Mexico courts have not construed the
statute; many cases, from other jurisdictions, have
been cited as bearing upon the necessity of payment of taxes before delinquency, where there is a
taxpaying requirement in an adverse possession
statute. We have examined these cases, and the
statutes upon which they are based. There is not
complete harmony in the cases; but to discuss the
cases would require an analysis of the statutes, and
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unduly prolong this opinion. __ After all, each statute
has its own background, which must not be overlooked. This act of Congress was passed to meet a
peculiar situation that arose after the decision of
the Sandoval and Candelaria Cases. In very rough
outline, we think Congress intended to protect the
rights of settlers who would have acquired property
rights, w~thout color of title, under the New Mexico
law as it existed prior to March 16, 1899. Where
there was color of t1tle, Congress used the date
of 10 years prior to statehood; and recognized such
claims resting on possess1on and color of title since
January 6, 1902. But to both classes, it made additional requirements-a continued possession on
down to 1924, and the taxpaying requirement. It
agreed to recognize claims so accrued, provided
that the claim and possession had continued until
1924, without interruption. It was concerned with
the good faith of the settler, and was saying that
a settler who has claimed ownership through the
years must be consistent; if he claimed ownership
to the Pueblo Lands Board, he must have assumed
ownership to the state through the years, by paying taxes like other owners. In short, there is no
reason apparent why a harsher burden should be
put on these settlers, as to their taxes, than on
their neighbors. Under the New Mexico law, the
owner can go to the office of the treasurer, and,
as a matter of right, clear his land of all tax claims,
by paying the taxes, interest, penalties, and costs,
at any time before tax sale. The ordinary man,
reading this statute, would conclude that he is 'paying taxes, if he pays money to a county treasurer to
discharge his property of liens arising from assessments made by taxing authorities. If, in 1924, all
the taxes levied since 1899 had been paid by John
Smith; if during those years no one else had paid
them or had a right to pay them; if he has never
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let the land go to tax sale-we think John Smith
can honestly say that he has continuously paid all
the taxes levied on the !and since 1899." (Emphasis ours.)
(NOTE: The tax sale referred to is comparable with
our May sale or Auditor's Sale and does not in any way
contemplate our preliminary sale.)
"We agree with counsel for the government that
'Congress evidently made tax payments a portion
of the test, because the full and regular payment of
taxes is the best evidence of a genuine and continuous claim of title in good faith.' We agree that
the circumstances of delinquency might be such
that it would reflect upon the good faith of his
possession, as required in other parts of the section,
even if the payments are made 'continuously' as
herein interpreted; but here the trial court has
found good faith, and its finding in that respect is
not challenged.
"Although it has not been urged, we have noted
that in the 1899 amendment the word 'continuously' is not used in connection with the taxpaying requirement, but was first used in the 1905 amendment. Ordinarily the insertion of a word in a
statute by amendment should be accorded particular significance. However, in the 1899 amendment
the taxpaying requirement was a part of the sentence requiring possession 'continuously'; by the
1905 amendment, the taxpaying requirement was
separated from the word 'continuously.' In any
event, to construe the word as 'promptly' or 'before
delinquency' appears to us to be unjustified, and
not in keeping with the spirit of the statute. We
therefore hold that, if a settler has paid all the
taxes assessed, with penalties and interest, for all
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of the years involved, prior to the filing of the
·suit, and prior to tax sale, he has complied with
the taxpaying requirement of the act. The question of whether taxes may be paid after tax sale,
but before the expiration of the period of redemption, is not presented by this record, and is not decided.
"V. With reference to the particular claims: In
some of the claims the evidence showed that for
a particular year the taxes were not paid at all.
The trial court held that the taxes were not 'lawfully assessed and levied' because of errors in the
description. The New Mexico Supreme Court has
just decided, in the case of Ferguson v. Gusdorf,
290 P. 214, that descriptions in tax assessments
must be 'sufficient, unaided, to identify the land.'
That decision is under an early statute, but on the
whole we conclude that the trial court correctly
applied the New Mexico statutes. As to one claim,
No. 76, the evidence shows that the taxes from
1919 to 1924 had not been paid when the suit was
filed. During the progress of the trial, a state
court decreed that the assessment was unlawful,
in that it was excessive, and the description indefinite. The question presented to the trial court
in this case was whether, at the date of filing the
petition, any taxes 'lawfully assessed' were unpaid. The trial court necessarily found this assessunlawful. The state court has also so decreed.
The claims cannot be defeated therefore because
of the nonpayment of unlawful assessments. The
circumstances concerning the taxes on this property reflect upon the good faith of the claim of
possession; but the trial court has found good
faith; the finding is not attacked, and the evidence
thereon not before us, and it cannot therefore be
reviewed."
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Reference is now made to states following the "minority rule" set up by this court in its opinion in the instant
case on page 984 of the Pacific Reporter.
MONTANA:
This state follows illinois in its taxing procedure and
the adverse possession statutes are similar to our state.
(1) Laas v. All Persons Claiming Any Interest, etc.,
(Montana), 189 P.2d 670.
This case involves adverse possession.
This is one of the cases which this Supreme Court held
in Bowen v. Olson, supra, was a minority case. This may
be true if the cases which require only the payment of taxes
and no possession are included in the summary. But if on
analysis of all of the cases, the cases to be considered are
limited to those which require adverse possession as well as
the payment of taxes, the cases are all in harmony except
those of Texas.
In this case, it is to be noted that no tax sales have
been made. There is also nothing in the opinion to show
that any redemption has been made of any final sale. However, in quoting statutes and cases of other states, the rule
of redemption from a tax sale is applied. The rules set forth
in Hinchman v. Whetstone, supra, Murphy v. Redeker, supra, and other cases cited herein are all made a part of
the decision. Further mention of this case will be given in
the next succeeding section of this brief.
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CALIFORNIA:
The California statutes and the statutes of Utah are
the most nearly alike of any of the states. Sections 322,
323, 324 and 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California
statutes are very comparable to our statutes. Likewise,
Deerings California Codes, under Revenue and Taxation,
Volume 1, page 192, Section 3436, et. seq., entitled "Sale
to State by operation of law," under Chapter 2, and Volume
1, Chapter 4, page 198, Section 3510, et. seq., entitled "Deed
to State", are more nearly like our Article 8, and Article
11, of our Revenue and Taxation Statute, Title 59, U. C. A.
1953.
There seems to be a conflict of authority in California
as set out in the footnote 10, on page 984 of the reporter.
An examination of the cases shows no conflict whatsoever

in any of the cases. First let us examine the cases wherein
it is said that the rule of redemption from tax sale being
the payment of taxes is not applied.
(1) McDonald v. McCoy, 121 Cal. 55, 53 P. 424.
"In that case, however, it appeared that the person in possession had failed to pay any taxes during his possession, and that the redemption took
place after he had ceased to have possession or
to claim any right thereto. In such a case there
may be good ground for saying that a subsequent
payment of the taxes by way of redemption from
such sale would not relate back to and aid the
previous possession so as to make it adverse from
the tiine of the tax sale to the time of such re-
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demption." Quoted from Owsley v. Matson, 156
Cal. 401, 104 P. 983.
(2) Myron v. Smith, 117 Cal. App. 355, 4 P.2d 219.
Smith, a tax title purchaser, was defendant in the case.
The defendant was not in possession in good faith. It was
held that he had no adverse possession, and had not paid
the taxes for the full five-year period.
(3) Gallo v. Gallo, 31 Cal. App. 189, 159 Pac. 1058.
"It is very clear to us that the defendant did not
sustain his plea of adverse possession.''

* * * * *
"The defendant did not personally occupy the
land. No one nor all of the persons to whom he
leased it ever occupied it for any five consecutive
years.''
From the foregoing, it can be seen that there was no
continuous possession and that the case did not revolve
primarily upon a case where there was adverse possession
and the payment of taxes was the only thing to be decided.
Now we come to the cases holding that redemption is
the payment of taxes.
(4)

Owsley v. Matson, 156 Cal. 401, 104 P. 983.

This case holds:
"But where, as in the present case, the tax has
been allowed to become delinquent and a sale has
taken place, and, so far as appears, a redemption
has been made thereof, while the party or his sue41
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cessor in interest was in undisturbed possession,
and all this is done in good faith, we see no reason
why the same should not be held to operate as a
payment, and we think it is sufficient to bring the
occupant within the terms of the statute which
requires him to pay the taxes upon the property
claimed." (Emphasis ours.)
In the case of Bowen v. Olson, supra, at the top of page
985, this Supreme Court attempts to make parallel cases
out of Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 99 Cal. 672, 34 P. 509, Owsley v. Matson, supra, and Christensen v. Munster, Utah, 266
P.2d 756. There is no parallel in the cases in this respect:
In the California cases, there were two separate assessments
of a part or all of the same property. The California court
held that payment by the adverser of the taxes assessed to
him was sufficient payment. In the Utah case, there was
but one assessment, and the prior owner paid the taxes
before the adverser tried to pay the same tax assessment.
It is illogical to suppose that the party paying taxes assessed
to him would be intending thereby to pay taxes assessed
to another party. In the Utah case, the party paying first,
paid taxes which were assessed to the other party and did
so intentionally.
(5)

Gray v. Walker, 157 Cal. 381; 108 Pac. 278.

The court says:
"The fact that in one year the land was sold for
delinquent taxes, and subsequently redeemed by
plaintiff, did not prevent the acquisition of title
by adverse possession. Owsley v. Matson, 104 Pac.
983."
42
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(6) Devlin v. Powell, 67 Cal. App. 165, 227 P. 231.
The court says:
"The point is made by appellant that certain of
the taxes were allowed to become delinquent, but
it appears from the transcript that these taxes
were subsequently paid, and that redemption was
had of the property while the plaintiffs and their
grantors were in the undisputed possession, and
therefore the rights of the plaintiffs in this particular are the same as though the taxes had not been
allowed to go delinquent." Quotes Owsley v. Matson, supra.
The distinguishing characteristic in the first three
cases above cited and the last three is definitely very clear.
If the taxes go delinquent and are redeemed while the adverser is in actual adverse possession, redemption is the
payment of the taxes. If taxes are redeemed while the adverser is not in possession, the rule is otherwise.
SUBDIVISION C.
The different statutes of the various states applicable
to tax sales will now be discussed. This division of the brief
will show the difference between the tax sales of the various
states and our own preliminary sale and May sale or auditor's sale.
ARKANSAS:
DIGEST OF STATUTES, ARKANSAS, KIRBY &
CASTLE, 1916, page 2023:
"SECTION 8746.

The collector shall make out
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and deliver to the purchaser of any land, or town
or city lot, or parts thereof sold for delinquent
taxes as aforesaid, a certificate of purchase, for
which the collector shall receive twenty-five cents,
to be taxed as costs of sale therein, describing the
lands or lots as the same were described in the
notice of sale, stating therein what part of such
tracts of land, town or city lot was sold, and the
amount of taxes, penalty and costs paid therefor.
Such certificate shall be assignable in law, and
an assignment shall vest in the assignee or his
legal representatives all the right, title and estate
of the original purchaser.
SECTION 8747. The clerk of the county court
shall, immediately after the sale, transfer upon
the tax-books all lands sold for taxes, to the name
of the purchaser, charging him therefor the sum
of ten cents for each tract, which shall be charged
and paid as part of the cost of sale (118) ."
ILLINOIS:
Cahill Illinois Revised Statutes, 1927, pages 2105, et.
seq. gives a very clear picture of the tax sale procedure of
Illinois. This procedure is very lengthy and cannot be
quoted here. The pertinent parts are set forth as follows:
1. The tax lien is foreclosed and an order of sale obtained from the court.
2. The tax lien is extinguished by the sale.
3. The property upon which there is delinquent taxes
is offered to the public.
4. The title to the property passes to the purchaser.
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5. A two year redemption period is given before the
deed is issued.
6. No further action or advertisement by the county
itself is required to issue the final tax deed.
COLORADO:
Mills Annotated Statutes (Revised Edition), pages 1075
to 1099 gives procedure for tax sales. Colorado follows
Illinois, and the same basic rules apply to the Colorado sales
as set forth above. This state likewise has a two year redemption period after tax sale.
SOUTH DAKOTA:
Statutes taken from Illinois.
Provides for a single sale and a two year redemption
period.
NORTH DAKOTA:
Statutes taken from Illinois although procedure is less
complicated.
Two year redemption period after final sale allowed.
WASHINGTON:
Statutes are taken from Illinois and the same foreclosure proceeding on tax sales is used. Section 9253, Remington and Ballinger's Codes and Statues of Washington, Volume 2, page 2113, provides:
"4: Such certificate (the tax sale certificate) shall
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have the same force and effect as a judgment execution and sale of and against the premises included therein."
The statutes provide for judgment on the tax delinquency and a sale at which the above certificate of sale is
issued. The Tax Deed may be obtained at any time within
three years, and until the tax deed is obtained, redemption
may be made.
MONTANA:
While this is a "minority rule" state, it likewise follows
the same tax sale procedure as Illinois. Three years are
allowed after tax sale in which to redeem. See Revised
Codes of Montana, 1947, Volume 5, Taxation, Chapter 41.
The state may obtain a deed for the property sold to the
state at any time after three years, but is not compelled
to do so. Redemption from the county can take place any
time before the tax deed is issued.
From the foregoing, the conclusions are reached, that
illinois, followed by Colorado, South Dakota, North Dakota,
Washington and Montana, have a redemption period from a
lone sale which is comparable to our May sale or auditor's
sale, and not from what is known as our preliminary sale.
Title passes at this sale, subject to the various redemption
periods. The offering is made to the public, and if no purchaser is available, the property is forfeited or deeded to
the state or county. In all cases, the tax collector or county
treasurer is relieved of the collection of taxes, and the tax
lien is extinguished by the sale.
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TEXAS:

Article 7281 Vernon's Civil Statutes of the State of
Texas, Volume 20, page 522, shows the tax sale procedure
which divests the delinquent taxpayer of title. Inasmuch
as Texas holds to the rule that under its five year adverse
possession statute, allowing taxes to become delinquent for
one year will toll the statute, there is no point in discussing
the effect of a redemption from a tax sale.
NEW MEXICO:

Pueblo DeTaos v. Gusdorf, 50 F. (2d) 721.
Quoting Chapter 22, Section 23, New Mexico Laws, 1899
and acts amendatory thereto:
"After receiving the amount for which and real
estate shall be sold, the collector shall execute and
deliver to the purchaser thereof a certificate of
sale containing a description of the property sold
and stating the name of the person or persons
against whom the same was assessed, or that the
same was assessed against unknown owners, as
the case may be, the amount paid therefor, that
it was sold for taxes, the amount and for the year
or years for which the taxes were assessed, the
amount of interest, penalties and costs, the date
of sale, and the consideration or amount so paid
therefor at such sale, that the collector, by virtue
of the authority vested in him by law, has sold
and does convey said real estate to said purchaser,
his heirs and assigns, subject to the right of the
former owner to redeem the same within three
years from date of sale by paying to the purchaser,
his heirs or assigns, the amount paid therefor at
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such sale with interest thereon at the rate of one
and one-half per cent per month from date of sale.
Such certificate must be recorded in the office
of the probate clerk of such county, in a book to
be kept for the purpose of recording such certificates and when so recorded, shall vest in the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, a complete legal title
to the real estate described therein, subject, however, to redemption as herein provided, and such
property shall thereafter, unless redeemed, be assessed in the name of the purchaser, or his assigns,
but the former owner shall have the right to redeem the same at any time within three years
from the date of sale by paying to the collector
then in office for the use of the purchaser the
amount of purchase money with interest at the
rate of one and one-half per cent per month from
date of such sale, together with any taxes that
may have been paid upon such real estate by the
purchaser and assignees with interest thereon at
the same rate; and such former owner may retain
possession of said real estate until redeemed, or
until the time of redemption has expired."
In reasoning on this case, the court said:
"Had the sale been made to a third person rather
than to the county, the payment, under the provisions of section 23, supra, would have been made
to the county treasurer for the benefit of such
third person, and neither the territory nor any of
its political sub-divisions would have received any
part thereof. Under such circumstances, it clearly
would not have been a payment of taxes.
"Section 23, supra, expressly declares that the
county purchasing at tax sales shall take the same
rights as an ordinary purchaser, and that the certificate of sale, when recorded, shall vest in the
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purchaser, his heirs or assigns a complete legal
title to the land, subject to redemption within three
years from the date sale.
"Section 22, supra, provides that, upon a sale to
the county 'the collector shall make an entry
"sold to the county" on the tax roll opposite the
tax and shall be credited with the amount thereon
in his settlement.'
"The sale of land to the county discharged the
claim for taxes. In lieu of such claim, the county
took the legal title to claim No. 8 subject to the
former owner's right of redemption. It had the
right to sell such title evidenced by the certificate
of sale at either a private sale for its face value,
or at public sale to the highest bidder. The payment in question was made not to discharge a
claim but to redeem claim No. 8 from the sale
and. to reinvest in the former owner the legal title
thereto. It was not a payment of taxes."
(2) McGrail v. Fields, 203 P (2d), 1000.
NEW MEXICO STATUTES 1941 ANNOTATED. Volume 5, page 1084. Section 76-708.
"76-708. Title vested by tax title-EasementsPossession-State as purchaser.- The t-ax sale
certificate shall vest in the purchaser, his heirs,
successors and assigns, or the state and its successors and assigns, as the case may be, subject to the
right of redemption as provided in this act, the
right to a complete title to the property described
therein; subject, however, to the easements of any
telephone, telegraph, transmission, or pipe-line company or any irrigation or drainage ditch or road
to which transmission, or pipe-line company or any
irrigation or drainage ditch or road to which such
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land may be subject, provided, that the purchaser
shall not be entitled to the possession of said property until the period of redemption has expired
and a deed has been executed therefor. The state
shall be deemed a purchaser within the meaning
of this act. (Laws 1934 (S. S.), ch. 27, No. 9,
p. 94; 1939, ch. 171', No. 1, p. 384.)"
"76-717. Tax Deed-Special assessment liensTitle-Easements-Fees-Property sold to State.'' At any time after the expiration of two (2) years
from the date of the tax sale certificate, where the
property has not been redeemed, on demand of
the holder of the tax sale certificate, the presentation thereto to the county treasurer, and the payment in full of any and all taxes and interest unpaid
at the date of application for deed, except as provided in section 33 (No. 76-634) thereof, the county treasurer shall issue and deliver to the legal owner and holder of said tax sale certificate a tax
deed to the property described therein. * * * *
Such deed shall vest in the grantee, his heirs, successors, and assigns, a perfect and complete title to
the premises free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, except as hereinafter provided in this
section, which deed shall be substantially in the
following form:"
"County treasurers shall issue a deed to the state
of New Mexico in the form as in this act provided,
and shall execute separate deeds for the property
described in each tax sale certificate sold to the
state and not assigned, upon the expiration of the
period of redemption.''
From a close examination of all of the statutes regarding tax taxes of the states quoted as above set forth, the tax
sale procedure has the following effect:
50
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1. The property is offered at a public sale to any bid-

der who may desire to purchase.
2. The certificate of the tax sale passes title to the property sold, to the purchaser or to the state, and in some
states the title is forfeited to the state.
3. The certificate of tax sale may be assigned by the
private purchaser or assigned or sold by the state or county
to any private individual.
4. By the tax sale, the tax lien is extinguished.
5. By the tax sale, the tax collector or county treasurer
as the case may be is credited in full with the amount of
the sale.
6. The redemptioner of the tax sale pays the amount
bid at the sale to redeem his title and not to pay to the tax
collector or county treasurer the delinquent taxes, penalty,
interest and costs.
As previously stated, California has a procedure somewhat similar to our own. At the preliminary sale, no public
sale is held and the property as a matter of law is sold to
the state as it is in our state. The redemption period in
California is five years, and then the tax deed issues automatically, as it did in Utah before the passage of our 1939
statute.
Comparing the Utah statutes of 1943 which were in
force in 1947, with the above requirements we find as follows:
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1. Originally No. 6018, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917,
in our first sale, provided for a sale to the public, with the
county receiving the property if no bid was made.

By Chapter 139, Laws of Utah, 1921, page 381, the lands
could not be sold for a current delinquency to a private person, but had to be sold to the county. This was carried
into Section 80-10-32, R. S. U. 1933, and the same section
in U. C. A. 1943. This was the law in effect at the time
of the 1947 sale in question here.
At the second sale, commonly called the May Sale and
the Auditor's Sale, the following procedure was held in
cases where the property was sold to the county.
Section 6065, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, provides
for a sale to the public after the Auditor's Tax Deed has
been issued to the county conveying the title to the county.
Said Section 6056, was amended by Sessions Laws of Utah,
1921, page 384, Chapter 140. Section 80-10-68, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933 is the amended section for said Section 6056. Section 80-10-68 was amended by Laws of Utah,
1939, Chapter 101, and said amendment re-wrote the entire
section, providing for the sale by the auditor BEFORE the
title passed to the county, to the general public, and if no
bids were received, then the fee simple title passed to the
county in May. This was carried into Section 80-10-68,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, applicable in this case.
As to the proposition that the property must be offered
to the public before the "majority rule" can be followed, the
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only sale we have offering the land to the public is our
May sale or Auditor's Sale after the redemption period has
expired.
2. Originally, there was a certificate of sale in Utah.
This was provided for in Sections 6020 and 6021, Compiled
Laws of Utah, 1917. No title passed by this certificate. It
could be issued to a private person or to the county. These
two sections were amended by Chapter 1939, Session Laws
of Utah, 1921, page 381. By this amendment, the sale was
restricted to the county only and private persons could not
bid. The amended sections 6020 and 6021 became Sections
80-10-34 and 80-10-35, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. The
1933 code was amended by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 1939,
the amendment abolishing the tax sale certificate and providing for a tax sale record certified by one certificate of
the county treasurer for all sales. Sections 80-10-33, 80-1034 and 80-10-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, carried forward Sections 6020 and 6021, and former sections 80-10-34
and 80-10-35. The 1943 code was in effect when the 1947
sale was made. There was no tax sale certificate at that
time. No title passed to the county or anyone else.
3. Section 6023, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, provided for the sale by the county of its certificate of sale.
Any person could become the purchaser at private sale.
The certificate was assigned by the auditor to the purchaser. The purchaser had to pay all of the delinquent taxes,
penalty, interest and costs. The sale was still subject to
redemption by the former owner by paying the delinquent
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taxes, penalty, interest and costs, the interest to be 1% per
month. Chapter 122, Session Laws of Utah, 1919, page
339, amended this section to limit the assignment to "any
person or corporation holding a recorded mortgage or other
lien against such real estate." The general public could no
longer obtain assignments of certificates of sale made to
the county. The said section, as amended, became Section
80-10-36, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. Laws of Utah,
1939, Chapter 101, amended this section, and carried it
forward into Section 80-10-36, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
which was in effect in 1947. The 1939 amendment and the
1943 code set up an "Assignment of Interest Under Tax
Sale." There is no provision for passing of title.
4.

There is no provision in Title 80, U. C. A., 1943,

for the tax lien to be extinguished by the preliminary sale.
In fact, the reverse is true if the discussion· in paragraph

5 hereafter is considered.
5. Under this heading, Section 80-10-63, U. C. A. 1943,
provides as follows:
"The auditor shall thereupon audit the books and
records of the treasurer and shall have a final
settlement with him. In making such settlement
he shall credit the treasurer upon the account provided for in section 80-8-8 with the amount of
taxes for the previous year which are found to be
still unpaid and shall then charge the treasurer
upon the books of the county in an account which
shall be called the delinquent tax control account
with the full amount of delinquent taxes, penalty
and costs found due the county for the previous
year."
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The lien for the taxes is not extinguished. The taxes
are merely delinquent and a new account is made settlng
up the delinquencies, penalty and costs not as the amounts
due from a sale but as a matter of law for the collection of
the taxes. The treasurer is still required to collect these delinquent taxes, penalties and costs. This is entirely different than any other state except California. Our preliminary
sale does not absolve the treasurer from further duties, in
the collecting of delinquent taxes.
6. Section 80-10-59, U. C. A. 1943, provides for redemption from our preliminary sale. He may do so by paying
the delinquent taxes, interest, penalty and costs, and not
by paying an amount previously bid at any sale. No title
having passed, these delinquent taxes are a lien, and redemption is made to remove the lien and not to reinvest the owner
with legal title. The statute reads in part:
"The county treasurer shall accept and credit on
account for the redemption of property sold for
delinquent taxes, at any time prior to the expiration
of the period of redemption, payments in amounts
of not less than $10 except the final payment which
may be in any amount. For the purpose of computing the amount required for redemption and for
the purpose of making distribution, of the payments
received on the account thereof, all such payments
shall be applied in the following order:
''First, against the interest accrued upon the delinquent tax for the last year included in said delinquent account at the time of payment;
"Second, against the penalty charged upon the
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delinquent tax for the last year included in the
delinquent account at the time of payment;
"Third, against the delinquent tax for the last year
included in the delinquent account at the time of
payment;
"Fourth ,against the interest accrued upon the delinquent tax for the next to last year included in
the delinquent account at the time of payment;
"And so on until the full amount of the delinquent
tax, penalty and interest upon the unpaid balances
shall have been paid within the period of redemption as aforesaid." (Emphasis ours.)
Such redemption is made specifically to pay delinquent
taxes and to absolve the property from the tax lien. No
mention is made of paying any amount ''to redeem the land
from the sale and reinvest the owner with legal title."
Bowen v. Olson, supra.
SUBDIVISION D.
This is the crux of the whole situation. This Supreme
Court has on numerous occasions held that the preliminary
sale does not foreclose the lien for taxes, that the tax lien
continues, that no title passes until the Auditor's Tax Deed
is made to the county, or the Auditor's Certificate is affixed
to the Preliminary Tax Sale record. The redemption is made
to discharge the lien for taxes, and not to reinvest the owner
with legal title.
We think it clear from the statements in the opinion of
Bowen v. Olson, supra, that this Supreme Court did not con-
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sider Aggelos v. Zelia Mining Company, supra, to be a parallel case in holding that "the purchase at a tax sale did not
amount to the payment of taxes for such purpose." Although Aggelos v. Zelia Mining Company, supra, quotes Robertson v. Bachmann, supra, we have shown that the latter
case does not involve adverse possession, but a statute requiring the payment of taxes only, and that the so-called
"majority rule" does not apply to statutes involving adverse
possession.
In its opmwn in Bowen v. Olson, supra, this court
eschewed the case of Sorensen v. Bills, 70 Utah 509, 261 P.
450 because such case does "not involve any question of
adverse possession." However, this case is the background
for many adverse possession cases and other cases as well
that redemption is the payment of delinquent taxes and not
the redemption of title which has passed. We now proceed
to quote some of these cases and cite many more.
In Hanson v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 46 P.2d, 400, this
Supreme Court made a ruling which has been repeatedly
held both before and after, as the basis of the construction
of our tax sale statutes. We quote profusely from this case
for the reason that until the Bowen v. Olson, supra, case
was decided ,there was no departure from the princples laid
down in the case under consideration. It is to be noted that
this case was decided before the 1939 amendment abolishing
the tax sale certificate, as are many more of the cases hereinafter quoted.
After quoting Section 80-10-59, U. C. A. 1943 above
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quoted, the opinion reads on page 406 of the Pacific Reporter:
"The county cannot be a redemptioner from itself
nor for the other governmental units for which the
county collects general taxes. Construing section
6024, Comp. Laws 1917, in the case of Sorensen v.
Bills, 70 Utah, 509, 261 P. 450, 451, the court said:
'The owner of the property, within the period allowed for redemption, had redeemed the property
from that tax sale, and thereafter any right that
the county had by reason of the levy and the tax
in the year 1917 was extinguished to the same extent that its claim would have been had the taxes
been paid prior to the delinquent tax sale. * * *'
"When the period of redemption has expired and
the county has received a tax deed for any real
estate sold for delinquent taxes, and county tax lien
merges into the title as effectively as by execution
sale with further rights of redemption as the statute provides. Purchasers from the county then
take with a 'new and complete title in the land,
under an independent grant from the soverign authority, which bar or extinguishes all prior titles and
incumbrances of private persons, and all equities
arising out of them.' "

* * * * *
"The purchaser from the county (not a redemptioner) take title free and clear of liens, otherwise
the county would be hampered in collection of taxes and prevented from again having the property
returned to the assessment rolls."

* * * * *
"If he then permits the redemption period to expire
and the title to become vested in the county or a
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purchaser after the redemption period expired, his
mortgage lien is extinguished, although the contract and debt obligation between the mortgagor
and mortgagee may still subsist." (Emphasis added.)
Continuing on at pages 420 and 421 of the Pacific Reporter:
"When the period of redemption has passed and the
auditor transfers the property to the county for the
taxes, then the general tax lien is foreclosed and
the lien disappears, because the county in whose
favor the lien ran itself takes the title. The lien
for general taxes disappears, and so do all inferior
liens or rights to resort to the land for payment
of debts."

* * * * *
"By section 6056, Comp. Laws 1917, the board of
county commissioners 'may', at any time after the
period of redemption has expired and before the
so-called May sale, permit the redemption from any
sale where the property has been sold to the county.
By the 1933 Revision (80-10-68) the word 'may'
was changed to 'shall' so as to require the county
commissioners to grant redemption. This is a privilege given to save the taxpayer from the ultimate
loss of his property as long as it is still within the
possibility of the county to permit it, but does not
change the theory that the liens are cleansed by
the auditor's deed to the county. It makes the former owner preferred as a purchaser for the taxes
and penalties."
If this Supreme Court were construing the SECOND

redemption period in the instant case and not the FIRST
redemption period, then a different result might be obtained
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and the ruling of the court in Bowen v. Olson, supra, be correct. But this opinion was handed down before the Tax
Sale Certificate and the Auditor's Deed were abolished by
the 1939 amendment. Surely after the 1939 amendment, no
title could possibly pass until after the May sale and the
Auditor's Certificate is affixed to the Preliminary Tax Sale
Record. There was no second redemption period after the
1939 amendment.
Continuing quoting from Hanson v. Burris, supra, this
Supreme Court said:
"Under the amendments, Chapter 139, Laws of
Utah 1921, lands could not be sold for a current
delinquency to a private person, but had to be
sold to the county, and certificate of sale going
only to the county. The auditor's deed then went
to the county and the county having title to the
property sold from that point. Whatever the process, the final deed from the auditor to the county,
or, before the amendment of 1921, to the purchaser
after four years from the first sale, cut off not only
the inferior liens, but all the liens, and whatever
the nature of the right or lien given by section
2072, it was extinguished. As previously analyzed,
it was a right to subject through the taxing machinery each tract of land for the payment of its proportion of the indebtedness. That right is gone."
From the foregoing, the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that the FIRST redemption from the preliminary tax sale, even when a certificate of sale was made to
third parties, was a payment of taxes to discharge the property from the tax lien, and no title having passed until the
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auditor's tax deed issued (which is now abolished) the redemption was not made to redeem the tax payer's title.
Therefore, the statement made by this Supreme Court, in
Bowen v. Olson, supra, as follows:
"A payment made after the land has been sold for
taxes is not made to discharge a claim for taxes but
to redeem the land from the sale and reinvest the
owner with legal title."
is in error and without merit or precedent in this state and
is contrary to all decisions made under our tax sale procedure.
Millard County v. Millard County Drainage Dist., 86
Utah, 473, 46 P. (2d), 423 is a companion case to Hanson
v. Burris, supra.
In Bozievich v. Schlecta, supra, this Supreme Court
said, at page 240 of the Pacific Reporter:
"In Salt Lake Investment Co. v. Fox, supra, this
court held that a purchaser of a tax sale certificate
did not hold the property adversely to the record
owner because by the statute of this state the owner had a definite period of time within which to
redeem and when the purchaser took possession of
the property by virtue of a tax sale certificate it
was 'in effect, an admission on his part that he
held subject to the owner's right of redemption.'
"It will be noted that possession in the above case
was taken by virtue of a tax sale certificate. Such
a certificate does not purport to convey title to the
land. The purchaser of a tax sale certificate knows
that the legal owner has a certain definite period
within which he may redeem from the sale and
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until such period has passed it is presumed that
when such purchaser takes possession he takes it
in subordination to the right of the owner and not
adversely to him." (Emphasis added.)
In Richards v. State Tax Commission, 92 Utah 503, 69
P. (2d), 515 at page 516, this court said:
"Appellant has confused a redemption of property
from a tax sale to the county and a sale by the
county after title has vested in the county and the
right of redemption has gone."
So has thjs Supreme Court confused the redemption of
property from a tax sale to the county and a sale by the
county after the title has vested in the county and the right
of redemption has gone.

Such confusion appears in the

opinion in Bowen v. Olson in many places.
See also Utah Lead Co. v. Piute County, 92 Utah 1, 65
P. (2d) 1190. This case quotes Hanson v. Burris, supra. It
is an adverse possession case.
See also Western Beverage Co. of Provo, Utah, v. Hansen et ux., 98 Utah, 332, 96 P.(2d) 1105. This case turns
on Hanson v. Burris, supra.
Deseret Irr. Co., v. Bishop, 92 Utah, 220, 67 P. (2d),
210, follows the case of Hanson v. Burris, supra, and states:
"In the instant case, the plaintiff is in no position
to complain as to whether or not a May sale was
held. No attempt to redeem or to secure permission to redeem or to exercise a right of redemption
is either pleaded or proved. No suggestion is made
that any tender has been made either to the county
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or the purchaser from the county. Plaintiff is not
in a position to complain having by stipulation
agreed that the county had taken deed after the
expiration of the four-year period, and thereby,
if effect is to be given to the deed to the county,
divested the owner of title." (Emphasis ours.)
Morley Dean was never divested of title in the case
now before this court even though he let his 1947 and 1948
taxes go delinquent, because he redeemed the delinquent
taxes before any deed or certificate was made to divest him
of title.
Soderberg v. Holt, 86 Utah, 485, 46 P. (2d), 428, states:
"The stipulation speaks of the extinguishment of
the said tax lien on May 22, 1928, and from this
we would presume that the property had been redeemed and not purchased at a sale from the
county. As a technical matter, the lien of the
tax is extinguished by the auditor's tax deed to
the county." (Quotes Hanson v. Burris, supra.)
American Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah,
318, 117 P. (2d) 293, it is said, at page 297 of the Pacific
Reporter:
''The court found that all tax proceedings up to
and including the issuance of the tax deed were
regular and valid. That deed, as stated in the
prevailing opinion, vested the fee title in the county
and the plaintiff thereafter had only a right of
redemption until a valid May sale. Unless and until that right of redemption was exercised plaintiff
had no title to be quieted. The taxpayer's duty
in such case therefore is to redeem from the sale, or
to offer to redeem and make tender of the amount
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necessary for a redemption. When he has redeemed he has legal title which could support an action
at law."
The above statement refers to the SECOND redemption
period, and not to the FIRST redemption period. Title does
not pass until the Auditor's Tax Deed or, under the 1939
amendment, until the Auditor's Certificate is affixed to the
Preliminary Tax Sale record. If this court were talking
about the SECOND redemption period, its conclusions might
have been correct that redemption is not payment of taxes
because the title has passed to the county, and the redemption is made to redeem the title. But in the instant case,
we are talking about the FIRST redemption period.
The distinction to be noted is whether or not the certificate of tax sale conveys title. Under the 1943 statute in
force when the 1947 sale was made, the certificate of sale
had been abolished. But even though it were still used, the
governing rule is: Did the certificate of sale convey title?
If it did, redemption is not the payment of taxes. If it did
not, then redemption is the payment of taxes. This is manifest in an Oklahoma case. Oklahoma has the same tax sale
procedure as lllinois in the main, with the two year right
of redemption, with the purchaser to obtain a deed after
sixty days' notice to the former owner. This case is Kenworthy v. Murphy, 228 P.2d 382, which states:
"A certificate of purchase issued on a tax sale does
not constitute color of title. Harrell v. Enterprise
Savings Bank, 183 Ill. 538, 56 N. E. 63; McKeighan
v. Hopkins, 14 Neb. 361, 15 N. W. 711; Salt Lake
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Investment Co. v. Fox, 32 Utah 301, 90 P. 564, 13 L.
R. A., N. S., 627, 125 Am. St. Rep. 865. In the later
case of Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d
239, 240, the Utah court in referring to the rule
announced in Salt Lake Investment Co. v Fox, supra, said:
"In Salt Lake Investment Co. v. Fox, supra, this
court held that a purchaser of a tax sale certificate
did not hold the property adversely to the record
owner because by the statute of this state the owner had a definite period of time within which to
redeem and when the purchaser took possession
of the property by virtue of a tax sale certificate
it was "in effect, an admission on his part that he
held subject to the owner's right of redemption."
"'It will be noted that possession in the above case
was taken by virtue of a tax sale certificate. Such
a certificate does not purport to convey title to the
land. The purchaser of a tax sale certificate knows
that the legal owner has a certain definite period
within which he may redeem from the sale and until such period has passed it is presumed that when
purchaser takes possession he takes it in subordination to the right of the owner and not adversely to
him. * * * '"

"But in Tennessee a tax certificate describing the
boundaries of the premises is color, Winters v.
Hainer, 107 Tenn. 337, 64 S. W. 44. And in Arkansas it is held that a certificate of purchase is color,
since the statute makes the sale, and not the deed,
the investiture of title so far as adverse possession
is concerned, Worthen v. Fletcher, 64 Ark. 662,
42 s. w. 900."
There was no title passed by the 1947 sale. The tax
lien was not extinguished and when Morley Dean paid his
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taxes on December 29th, 1949, and redeemed it from the
lien, it was done by the paying of taxes.
ERROR III.
The court erred in holding that the mineral estate was
subject to the general rule it made that redemption was not
the payment of taxes, for the reason that no taxes were
assessed against the mineral estate for the years 1947, 1948
and 1949, and such mineral estate was never sold for taxes.
Referring to Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, the abstract of title,
it is to be observed at pages 41-42, that J. Parry Bowen, also
known as J. Perry Bowen, also known as J.P. Bowen, and
his wife, conveyed to J. A. Cheney an undivided one half
interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in
and under and that may be produced from the lands involved
in this action and other lands, by Mineral Deed acknowledged August 19th, 1946, and recorded August 21st, 1946, in
Book "10" of Miscellaneous, pages 332-333 of the records of
Uintah County, Utah.
This deed constituted a severance of the surface and
and mineral estate.
Section 80-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, in effect
when the 1947 taxes were assessed, reads as follows:
"80-5-3. By State Tax Commission-Properties
Assessed by, Enumerated * * * * * all mines and
mining claims, and the value of metalliferous mines
based on three times the annual net proceeds thereof as provided in section 80-5-56, and all other
mines and mining claims and other valuable depos66
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its, including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons,
nonmetalliferous minerals underlying land the sur
face of which is owned by a person other than the
owner of such minerals, * * 'x' * o~:, must be assessed
by the state tax commission as hereinafter provided." (Emphasis ours).
The abstract of title, Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, pages 59 and
60, shows all assessments for taxes made against the land
between 1940 and 1949. There is no assessment made
against J. A. Cheney, or his successors in interest, or against
J. Parry Bowen, for any interest in minerals, after the deed
to Cheney in 1946.
In Utah Copper Co., v. Chandler, et. al., 45 Utah, 85,
142 Pac. 1119, this Supreme Court held:
"To make good title by adverse possession, the defendants were required to pay all taxes lawfully
levied and assessed against the premises so claimed
by them. If, however, no taxes were lawfully assessed or levied against the premises so claimed and
occupied by them, they could acquire title by adverse possession without payment of taxes."
This proposition is fully discussed at pages 9 to 15 of
Appellants' Reply Brief filed in the original appeal.
For the sake of argument, granting that the surface
estate may not be obtained by the plaintiff, Morley Dean,
because of his failure to pay the 1947 and 1948 taxes before
they became delinquent, there is no basis for not quieting
the title to the mineral estate in the various mineral owners,
inasmuch as Morley Dean, as the constructive trustee of
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the mineral owners, continued in possession up to the time
of trial, and the title of the mineral owners had then ripened
into adverse possession without tacking on the payment of
the 1947 and 1948 taxes on the surface.
ERROR IV.
As to point ill in the original appellants' brief on file
in this rna tter, we wish to stress that the rulings of this
court support the argument given at pages 27 to 34 of the
brief. These rulings are fully set forth in the former brief.

In United States v. Wooten et al., 40 F. (2d), 882, the
court said:
"V. With reference to the particular claims: In
some of the claims the evidence showed that for
a particular year the taxes were not paid at all.
The trial court held that the taxes were not "lawfully assessed and levied" because of errors in the
description. The New Mexico Supreme Court has
just decided, in the case of Ferguson v. Gusdorf,
290 P. 214, that descriptions in tax assessments
must be 'sufficient, unaided, to identify the land.'
That decision is under an early statute, but on the
whole we conclude that the trial court correctly
applied the New Mexico statutes. As to one claim,
No. 76, the evidence shows that the taxes from
1919 to 1924 had not been paid when the suit was
filed. During the progress of the trial, a state
court decreed that the assessment was unlawful, in
that it was excessive, and the description indefinite.
The question presented to the trial court in this
case was whether, at the date of filing the petition,
any taxes 'lawfully assessed' were unpaid. The
trial court necessarily found this assessment un-
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lawful. The state court has also so decreed. The
claim cannot be defeated therefore because of the
nonpayment of unlawful assessments. The circumstances concerning the taxes on this property reflect upon the good faith of the claim of possession;
but the trial court has found good faith; the finding
is not attacked, and the evidence thereon not before us, and it cannot therefore be reviewed." (Emphasis ours.)
It is significant to note, that the trial court in the case

before the court, not only found that Morley Dean was acting in good faith, but that it "tends to offend one's sense
of justice" to decide against Dean and the other plaintiffs.
Can this Supreme Court, in fairness, say to the plaintiffs "you have been in good faith in your possession, and
have paid taxes for seven years under our previous rulings,
it offends justice to decide against you, but we cannot allow
you to show the invalidity of the eighth year's tax sale because the lower court denied your motions to show such invalidity."
But most assuredly the lower court and this Supreme
Court cannot say that an assessment is made according to
law, when the tax was paid by the adverser and the opposing
party claims that the sale is a valid sale which divests the
adverser of title (when it does not), unless the one who
makes the claim of validity offers proof thereof.
As to point IV, under subdivisions A and C thereof,
pages 34 to 36, and pages 45 to 53 of the original Appellants'
Brief, supported by Point IT of Appellants' Reply Brief, at
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pages 5 to 9 thereof, the argument stated in the two previous
briefs are sufficient, and should be given thorough consideration on this rehearing.
As to point V in the original brief, at pages 53 to 56
of the said Appellants' Brief, is a comprehensive argument
showing that Olson is guilty of laches. This subdivision
and point should be given careful consideration by this Supreme Court.
The writer has been involved in many cases in which
the adverser has allowed his taxes to become delinquent
and while in adverse possession in good faith, he has redeemed these from the preliminary tax sale.

In most

of such cases, the adverser has spent considerable time and
money improving the land, has greatly added to its assessed
value, has made a tax revenue considerably higher than it
was before, and being a resident on the land or in its vicinity,
has used it to its best advantage.

In nearly all of the cases,

the former record title owners were non-residents of the
state, and most of them held the land for speculation.

It

could have lain in the sun without use and without taxation
forever unless some oil boom or uranium boom came along
which would allow their speculative instinct to be aroused.
We do not think that any of these speculators should be
allowed to come back to Utah after absences of many years,
with the smell of oil in their nostrils, or the heat of uranium
firing their desires, and reclaim their property because an
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adverse occupant in good faith has failed to pay one year's
taxes on time. We think that the rule quoted concerning
laches by the California court should be applied in this case
and in many others where such speculators have failed to
show any good faith and have failed for more than fifteen
years to carry the tax burdens of the state and other taxing
units.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, appellants most strongly urge that:
1. This Supreme Court has already found that plaintiffs have seven years' adverse possession, and have paid
seven years' taxes to support such possession.
2. That there is no precedent in the United States (except in Texas) to support the contention that under our adverse possession statutes, redemption from our preliminary
tax sale by one in actual adverse possession in good faith,
is not the payment of taxes.
3. That even though this court had not found that
plaintiffs had complied with the adverse possession statute,
plaintiffs should have been given judgment on the counterclaim interposed by the defendant, Olson.
4. That the mineral interest, not being assessed for
the years 1947, 1948 and 1949, should without doubt under
any consideration be quieted in the plaintiffs according to
their respective interests.
5. That in equity the plaintiffs should prevail and the
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Lower Court's "sense of justice" should not be offended.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE B. STANLEY
COLTON & HAMM:OND
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, CrossDefendants and Appellants.
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